CHAPTER ONE
The Drink They Wanted Back
New Coke, 1985 · From The World They Sold Us by M. T. Vale.
Coca-Cola announced its new formula on April 23, 1985. The original returned as Coca-Cola Classic in July. This complete opening chapter follows the decision, the response, and what the evidence can tell us.
Go to the 12 source notes ↓On July 10, 1985, the Coca-Cola Company announced that it would bring back Coca-Cola. The returning drink needed a new name, Coca-Cola Classic, because another Coca-Cola had taken its place. The replacement was staying too. Americans were about to have a choice between the product they had been buying and the one their supplier had decided they would like better.1
Three months earlier, the decision had looked considerably simpler. Coca-Cola was losing ground to Pepsi in the American cola business, the part of the soft-drink market where its familiar red label had long seemed most secure. Diet Coke, introduced in 1982, had been a success, but that did not settle the problem of the company's regular cola. Its chairman, Roberto C. Goizueta, and its president, Donald R. Keough, had reason to take a new taste seriously.2
On April 23, at a heavily publicized event in New York's Lincoln Center, the company announced a reformulation of its flagship drink. It was smoother and somewhat sweeter, according to the people selling it. More important, they said, consumers had chosen it in research.3
Coca-Cola reported a testing program involving roughly 190,000 consumers in the United States and Canada. In blind comparisons, the new taste was preferred to the old by 55 percent to 45 percent. When the brand was identified, the company reported a larger advantage, 61 to 39. These were Coca-Cola's figures, reported to journalists.4
Still, the results were substantial enough to explain why executives found the change attractive. A majority preferred the new liquid when asked to compare tastes. Goizueta told reporters that thousands of consumers had expressed the preference. He presented the decision to change the product as an unusually easy one.5
There was a second decision concealed inside the first. Coca-Cola was not simply adding another flavor for anyone curious to try it. It was removing the familiar formula from the ordinary product line. Someone who disliked the new drink could buy a competitor's cola, perhaps, but could no longer buy the old Coca-Cola as Coca-Cola. A comparison of samples had become a change in what would be available on a shelf.
The difference appeared almost immediately in interviews. In early May, the Los Angeles Times spoke to Patricia Kenyon of Anaheim, a Coca-Cola drinker of more than forty years. She compared the change to tearing down the Statue of Liberty. Joann Erickson of Santa Ana said she intended to stockpile the old drink while it could still be purchased. Neither woman was making a narrow claim about sugar, carbonation or which sip would win a tasting. They were objecting to the removal of something familiar.6
But the newspaper also found Melinda Nelson, who helped run a group of Coca-Cola enthusiasts in Orange County, expecting that people would come to like the new flavor. Her response matters. A vocal protest does not prove that everyone was angry, any more than a taste-test majority proves that nobody wanted the old drink kept in production.6
By June, a protest had become a small enterprise of its own. Gay Mullins in Seattle organized a campaign to bring back the old formula. He spent his own money, set up telephone lines and attracted publicity. In July, the Los Angeles Times reported that he had put $45,000 into the effort; his group said it had gathered more than 100,000 petition signatures. A lawsuit he filed to compel the old drink's return had been dismissed. He could call, organize and sue. He could not make Coca-Cola use a particular recipe.7
At Coca-Cola headquarters, the switchboard supplied a different kind of evidence. Company representatives reported thousands of calls and letters. Some people protested; others asked where the new product could be bought or how to store old bottles. When an anonymous account claimed that virtually every caller was furious, the company's spokesman disputed it.8
The commercial numbers gave management no equally neat answer. Company officials reported that shipments to bottlers had risen in May, during the first period of public trial. Brian G. Dyson, the head of Coca-Cola's American business, acknowledged in July that June sales were below expectations. Neither figure alone reveals how many people bought a second new Coke because they liked the first, how many were trying it once, or how many had stocked up on the outgoing formula.9
The argument inside the company was now being conducted in two languages. The launch had used the language of preference: given two samples, which tastes better? The letters, petitions and complaints used the language of loss: why had a choice been taken away? The early taste results were not necessarily wrong. They answered a narrower question than the one the company had put to its customers.
The return was announced on July 10. At a press conference the following day, Keough acknowledged that the company's elaborate consumer research had failed to reveal the strength of feeling attached to the familiar formula. Goizueta said the decision to restore it had been made that week. Executives also cited disappointing June results. There is no need to pretend that affection and sales could be separated cleanly in the decision; both were present in the explanation they gave.10
Some observers suspected the whole reversal had been arranged for publicity. Keough publicly denied it. The surviving reports show a company defending its April research, encountering an organized and visible backlash, then changing its offer. They do not establish a secret plan to provoke that backlash.11
And the new drink did not vanish. Both formulas remained available. Retail sales reports from the following winter still recorded a measurable share for new Coke, alongside a larger share for Classic. Some people evidently continued to buy the taste that had won the comparisons. The disputed decision in April was not whether that taste deserved a place in the market. It was whether the old one still deserved one.12
Coca-Cola had treated a preference for one sample as sufficient reason to replace a familiar product. Its customers had not been offered that same choice. When the original taste returned, it came back with an additional word on the label, a word that distinguished the drink people had known from the version the company had just introduced.
Classic. The product had needed a new name to remain what it was.
Notes
Art Harris and Nell Henderson, “Old Coke Is Back,” The Washington Post, 11 July 1985, contemporary dispatch datelined Atlanta, 10 July: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/07/11/old-coke-is-back/cfa020fb-82ba-4216-a9fb-b9a5442a8f19/ . Spokesman Thomas Gray said the old taste would return as Coca-Cola Classic and be sold in addition to the new formula. Los Angeles Times, Jube Shiver Jr., 11 July 1985, likewise documents plans for both. The public announcement came on 10 July, followed by the detailed news conference on 11 July.
Return to textMark Potts, “Coca-Cola Sweetens Its Success,” The Washington Post, 24 April 1985, published after the New York announcement: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1985/04/24/coca-cola-sweetens-its-success/86d4d700-fb40-478e-b7e6-944a61690f6e/ . Contemporary analysis of Pepsi pressure and regular Coca-Cola's comparatively stalled growth, alongside rising company product portfolio. The business rationale is not inferred from modern brand-performance charts.
Return to textPotts, 24 April 1985, contemporaneous account of 23 April event at Lincoln Center and reformulated taste, linked in N02. UPI index for a separate report describes the Vivian Beaumont Theater press conference: https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/04/23/Coca-Cola-the-worlds-No-1-consumer-product-said-Tuesday/3500483080400/ ; this UPI page could not be opened independently, so exact room detail is omitted.
Return to textPotts, 24 April 1985, reported 190,000 consumers overall in U.S./Canada, 55%–45% in blind tests and 61%–39% with brand identification; Heidi Evans, “Coke Fans in a Fizz Over New Formula,” Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1985, independently reports the public claims: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-05-04-me-20613-story.html. The newsroom accounts are not two independent audits of Coca-Cola's protocols; figures originated with the company. Original survey instruments, exact sample assignments and tabulations remain uninspected; the narrative does not say all 190,000 completed the specific blind or labeled comparison.
Return to textPotts, 24 April 1985, contemporary recorded Goizueta public explanation of consumer preference and decision. This is a contemporary account of the public explanation. Corporate press material and the exact executive speech manuscript were not consulted.
Return to textHeidi Evans, Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1985 (N04): direct reporting on Patricia Kenyon, Joann Erickson and Melinda Nelson, including Kenyon's Statue of Liberty comparison and Nelson's expectation that consumers would like the new Coke. These are named interviewees whose statements are not representative of all consumers. The chapter uses Kenyon's comparison in paraphrase.
Return to textJube Shiver Jr., Los Angeles Times, 11 July 1985, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-07-11-mn-8439-story.html ; Washington Post, 7 June 1985, “Coke, The Taste That Distresses,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1985/06/07/coke-the-taste-that-distresses/1f0758dd-98a2-4a9d-ae1c-c188c2228354/ . Shiver reports Gay Mullins spent $45,000 personally organizing his Public Response Corp. and the group claimed 104,000 signatures and over 23,000 letters. The petitions and accounts were not separately audited. Harris/Henderson (N01) reports his lawsuit dismissed; no court docket examined. His mobilization was not proved sole cause of management's reversal.
Return to textWashington Post, 7 June 1985 (N07), quoting Coca-Cola spokesman Coleman disputing an anonymous inflated share of negative correspondence and distinguishing callers' motives. Coca-Cola company retrospective “New Coke: The Most Memorable Marketing Blunder Ever?” confirms 1,500 calls/day by June versus 400 before, as a later interested source: https://www.coca-colacompany.com/about-us/history/new-coke-the-most-memorable-marketing-blunder-ever. Source numbers do not establish population opinions or the original purchase decisions of callers. Other UPI June reporting was indexed but not independently opened.
Return to textJube Shiver Jr., Los Angeles Times, 11 July 1985 (N07), records company-reported May sales increase and industry uncertainty about trial/hoarding; Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1985, “‘Wonderful to Be Loved Again’: Protests, Weak Sales Cited in Return of Original Coke,” direct July 11 press conference report: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-07-12-mn-8817-story.html. Brian G. Dyson described June sales as below the company's expectations, a company statement, not externally audited causal evidence.
Return to textLos Angeles Times, 12 July 1985, above: Keough publicly recognized that elaborate research had not captured deep attachment, Goizueta dated the final decision to that week, executives noted sales and complaints. The chapter refers to management's stated assessment, not internal minutes. Company later retrospective (N08) confirms broad chronology but is not the sole basis.
Return to textLos Angeles Times, 12 July 1985 (N09), records Keough's express denial that the reversal was planned. Washington Post, 20 April 1986, “Cola Wars,” describes contemporaneous speculation and company denial: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1986/04/20/cola-wars/0944c581-bf42-4b2f-b156-491e153b4b44/ . A public denial is not access to private intent; the chapter rejects the popular theory as unproven, not a fact conclusively adjudicated by the denial.
Return to textWashington Post, 20 April 1986 (N11), reports A. C. Nielsen food-store sales shares for December 1985–January 1986: 14.7% Classic Coke and 3.5% new Coke. These are shares of food-store soft-drink sales, not every channel or total nationwide sales. The contemporary July 10–11 announcements explicitly planned both formulas. Coca-Cola's later retrospective says the new brand was subsequently called Coke II and eventually left U.S. shelves, much later than the July restoration: source in N08. This chapter makes no measured claim that any particular psychological factor caused purchase, and it does not imply the 1886 ingredient mix survived literally unchanged through 1985.
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